The promise of their sure reunion speak,
And dry the tear that channels her smooth cheek!
But in their hearts—unlinked with thoughts that grieve—
The fadeless memory of the lost one leave,
A holy vision Love may ponder on,
When all the bitterness of wo is gone;
And say, the angel to their fond arms given,
Was only from those dear embraces riven,
To turn their thoughts forever more to Heaven!

Flatbush, Long-Island, New-York.

EDITORIAL REMARKS.

[The literature of our pages belongs to the Republic of Letters—the Navy of our Country to THE Republic of Freemen. We have the improvement of the one, as much at heart, as the advancement of the other. Our columns are open to the officers of the Navy; and we here again repeat our invitation to them, to discuss the measures and means for putting the Navy on a proper footing. We have hoisted the flag of 'REFORM TO THE NAVY,' and nailed it to the mast. Under it we mean to fight as long as there is a 'Scrap in the Lucky-Bag,' or, as a sailor would say, 'a shot in the Locker.'

The points mooted in the letters below are of moment to the whole Country, and of especial interest to the South and West. A share of public patronage is due there. We claim it for them, and bid them look to it, as they value their own welfare, and love their own interest. Let the press in those sections take up the subject; and our word for it, not only will the people of the South, but those of the Mississippi Valley, in its whole length and breadth, demand, with one voice, the measures here proposed. We can do no more in this matter, than 'hoist the signal.' The local press must do all the fighting. We call upon every paper in the South and West, that is friendly to the Navy, that is true to its Country and itself, to 'clear away its battery,' and stand to its guns; to keep this subject before the people, and to second the laudable efforts of our correspondent,—for we take it for granted, that as to the measures advocated by him, there can be but one opinion.]—*Ed. Sou. Lit. Mess.*

No. I.

COUNCIL BLUFF, *July* 15, 1841.

TO MR. CLAY.

SIR,—

I address you, not as a politician, whig, or party man, of any sort; but as an American statesman, whose mind is filled, and whose heart is warmed, with true notions of government—as one who loves his country, is true to its constitution, who knows his duty, and will not fail to act well the part of statesman and patriot in the great national drama.

You have been ready at all times to maintain abroad the honor and dignity of your country—and you have ever stood forth as the great champion of Southern and Western interests at home; and so far as the Navy may support the one, or advance the other, I wish to call not only your attention, but the attention of every freeman in the South and the West to certain measures connected with the Navy, that are near, and should be dear to them.

I wish, through you, to call their attention to the monopoly, which has hitherto been enjoyed by a few Atlantic States, of all the local advantages to be derived from the Navy—such as the establishment of Dock-Yards—the building of ships—the opening of rendezvous—and the annual disbursement of millions out of the public treasury, &c.—I wish to call their attention also to the fact, that both the South and the West possess advantages, and afford facilities for national Depots, Dock-Yards, and other Naval establishments, second in importance to none others in the Union. I wish also to show, that such establishments are not only required by the interests of the South and the West—but that a speedy location of them is absolutely demanded for the welfare, safety and honor of the whole country.

Virginia established at her own expense, the Navy-Yard at Gosport; and in 1800 ceded it to the United States, on condition that the General Government should maintain there a Navy-Yard forever. In this manner was acquired the only building Navy yard, which to this day is possessed to the South of Mason & Dixon's line.

In colonial times, it was said, that not so much as a 'hob nail' should be manufactured on this side of the water. In later years, and with regard to the Navy, it has been proclaimed in effect—for the policy has been practically carried out—that not even a scupper nail or a pump tack shall be furnished to the Navy at the South.

Does a vessel of the West-India squadron have a sheet of copper ripped from her bottom? she must come to the North to have it nailed on. Do a few oysters fasten themselves there? she must come to the North to have them scraped off. Her crew becomes a few hands short by death and desertion? she leaves hundreds of able bodied seamen loitering in the streets of Mobile and New-Orleans, and passes by others in Charleston, on her way to the North to ship a score of men. Does she want repairs of any kind? she is sent to the North to have them done. The time of her crew expires—she hastens to the North to pay them off and discharge them, that they too may spend their money at the right place. Shipping rendezvous opened for seamen at Charleston, Mobile and New-Orleans, would supply the whole West-India squadron with able bodied men, and save many a 'good tall fellow' whom the Summer pestilence destroys in those cities. A rendezvous at Natchez, Louisville, Cincinnati and St. Louis, would furnish the same squadron with an ample complement of landsmen, marines, apprentices and boys, who might be paid off at the South—spend their money at the South—and thus save the time and expense of these frequent trips to the North. Why should not Pensacola be provided with all the facilities of building and repairing? That she is not, is but an illustration of the *hob-nail* vassalage, which, to this day, as far as the Navy is concerned, the South is required to render to the North.

From Virginia to New-Hampshire, more than

one hundred millions of dollars out of the public treasury have been disbursed for the Navy, since the war—never a cent in the West, and if we except a paltry sum at Pensacola, scarce a dollar in the South. Proud of the Navy, and mindful of the national dignity and honor, never a murmur from the West, has been raised against this partial distribution of the public bounty.

But times have changed. By the revolution which the powers of steam are effecting in the means of maritime warfare, the Mississippi boatmen will be to the Navy in the next war, what our Marblehead seamen were in the last. And, are the yeomen of the West less brave and patriotic, the Southrons less loyal and true, than their brethren at the North, that they should be excluded from the Navy—shut out from its honors in war, and its benefits in peace?

I beseech your attention to this subject; for I hope to show that justice to the West, as well as the common weal of all the States, require that certain Naval establishments and means of defence, should be connected with the waters of the Mississippi. If I succeed in doing this, I further hope that you will take up the subject in your capacity as an American statesman and legislator—not upon party grounds or sectional interests, but upon the broad grounds of the necessities, the honor and welfare of the State.

First then, I beg leave to call your attention to the 'Scraps,' published, from time to time, in the Southern Literary Messenger, from the "Lucky-Bag of Harry Bluff." That writer advises the establishment on the Mississippi, of a National Dock-Yard for steamers; and urges important considerations in favor of the measure.

Memphis, Tennessee, is the most suitable place for such an establishment. The draft of water thence to the Gulf, is at all times sufficient for the passage of the boats to and fro. The river there is never blocked with ice. The location is healthy. It is high enough up to be secure from invasion, or molestation by an enemy. It is at the corner of three States, all of which are alike interested in, and would be equally benefited, by such an establishment.

Instead of carrying the live-oak from Louisiana to New-York or Boston, for building steamers, as we now do, it could then be carried at half the cost, and only one-sixth the distance, to Memphis. A national Dock-Yard there, would open a market for the hemp of Kentucky—the coal of Pennsylvania—the pork of Ohio—the beef of Illinois—the flour of Michigan—the copper of Iowa—the lead of Missouri,—and for the iron, the mechanical skill and agricultural products, of all these States.

The United States Steamer Fulton of 720 tons, and H. B. M. Steamer Cyclops of 1,195 tons, were the first steam men-of-war built in this country and in England. The American vessel, built of native timber, cost $333,000, or upwards of $460 per ton;—the English vessel, built of imported timber, chargeable with a duty varying from 100 to 500 per cent., cost, completely armed and rigged for sea, £54,024,* or less than $240 a ton. The English have their timber to buy and import; we have it for the cutting down,—and with these advantages it costs $460 a ton, to build war-steamers in the Eastern States. Are Mississippi steamboats built at this rate? You know they are not. A Dock-Yard there for war-steamers, would beget a laudable spirit of emulation between the West and the East. With such an establishment, properly conducted, we should find, that we can build in the West—if we cannot in the East, at least as cheaply as they can in England.

Greater than all these partial benefits, would be the national advantages to be derived by introducing the Navy in the West. Her sons would man our vessels sailing thence; popular prejudices against the Navy and the sailor's calling, would be removed; and by the force of habit and association, there would be rendered available to the country in war, the services of eight or ten thousand Western watermen, who would man our armed steamers far more efficiently than the seamen of the East. It is important to gain over from these men, predilections for the Navy; and this can only be done by creating, as it were, a Navy in the midst of them; enlisting their sons, brothers, friends and neighbors, in the service; and by affording them all, frequent opportunities of going on board, and otherwise being in contact with, the public vessels.

Tennessee is the fifth State in the Union. Considering the breakwaters and seawalls, the forts and castles, the coast surveys, Navy-Yards, harbor defences, and the like, that abound in the Eastern States,—that many millions of a common fund have been disbursed even in the smallest of those States,—that scarcely a dollar of this fund, finds its way to Tennessee, Mississippi, *et al.*—considering, I say, all these things, the preference given to Tennessee will appear but just, even were there in other States twenty other places, as there is not one, as suitable as Memphis for the Dock-Yard of the West. UNION JACK.

—

No. II.

COUNCIL BLUFF, *July* 15, 1841.

TO MR. CLAY.

SIR,—

Having consulted economy, and the interests of the Navy, and therefore of the nation, by establishing a Dock-Yard for steamers amidst the resources of the West, and at a convenient point to the Gulf of Mexico, which is to be the cockpit for the pitched battles of Yankee tars in the next war;

* £54,024; p. 67 Miles' Royal Naval Service.

and having moreover acknowledged the claims of justice by placing that Yard in Tennessee, you must go a step further, and advocate the founding there also of a Naval Academy.

The East has its Military Academy. The most effectual means of allaying the popular clamor, which, in remote parts of the country, you have heard raised from time to time against that noble institution, is to offset it with a similar one for the Navy in the West. By being placed in opposite sections of the country, one would give stability to the other.

A writer in one of the periodicals of the day, has urged, at great length, the establishment of a school-ship for the Navy. Though the school-ship appears to me to have been advocated by him solely on the grounds of expediency—Congress having failed to endow a school on shore. For my own part, I should be glad to see, and should hail with delight, the establishment of a school any where for the Navy—even on the top of the Rocky Mountains. From thence, as the king Penguins do their young, the 'Reefers' could be marched down to 'salt water' once a year, and be taught to put into practice the theories they had learned in the rookery.

There is no doubt, that the Navy would derive many important and lasting advantages from a school, wherever placed, for the education of its officers. There may be much diversity of honest opinion as to the most suitable place for a Naval Academy. Many officers of sound judgment, think the vicinity of 'salt water' indispensable to a flourishing Naval School; and but for the importance which steam is assuming in ocean navigation, it would perhaps be considered important by all, that the seat of education for the Navy, should be near the sea. But considering that steam is to become a great motive-power in ships-of-war, the study of its principles, application and machinery, must necessarily form an indispensable part of the education of every well instructed Navy officer. Therefore this school should be near the Dock-Yard of Memphis, where all the requisite facilities for acquiring this knowledge could alone be afforded.

In the opinion of those who have reflected maturely on the subject, no more Midshipmen should be admitted in the Navy than are required to fill vacancies; and these should be promoted as soon as qualified after seven years of service—four years of which, except three months of each year, should be devoted to the academic course;—the remainder of the time should be spent at sea.

Three years then would be the time actually allowed for instructing the pupils in the theory of their profession, and making them acquainted with the steam engine. At the Memphis Yard they would see the machinery built, put together, set to work, and taken down. There, and only there, the structure, management, internal arrangements of engine and boilers, would be constantly before them both for study and for practice.

They would make an annual cruise of three months at sea, in vessels manned by themselves, for the purpose of putting in practice, by way of relaxation, the principles of what they had been taught at the Dock-Yard. These cruises might sometimes be made in a steamer, and sometimes in an old-fashioned ship, with her wings of cotton and hemp: when in the latter, the Midshipmen could go in the former to the New-Orleans bar, or to Pensacola, for embarkation.

If the number of pupils graduating annually, should be more than sufficient—and I think it should be—to supply the vacancies in the Navy, the supernumeraries should be encouraged to seek—where they doubtless would find—ready and profitable employment to their country and themselves, either in the river-boats, ocean-steamers, or ships of the commercial marine.

The knowledge of steam machinery and navigation carried by them into those occupations, would prevent many of the losses and calamities by sea and river, which are now of such frequent occurrence; and which you are striving in vain by legislative action to prevent.

Besides promoting the interests of humanity, and checking the frightful loss of life and property, which now occurs through carelessness or ignorance, they would render their country services in another respect, not less important.

The advantages of their nautical education—their early taste of military life, and habits of subordination, would render these supernumerary graduates a valuable "corps of reserve;" from which, in case of necessity, the Navy could at once be supplied with a full war-complement of well trained and skilful officers.

By way of Illustration: Suppose this country at war with one of the maritime nations of Europe. What with Baltimore Clippers, Packets, Bay and Lake Steamers—Men-of-War on the stocks, and to be built, it could, in the course of eighteen or twenty months, have two or three hundred vessels-of-war afloat. Where would the requisite number of well trained and skilful officers be obtained for this force? And at the cessation of hostilities, what is to be done with the vast number of supernumerary officers the government would find in its employ? The turning of them adrift upon the cold charities of the world, and after they had bravely fought, and shed their blood, for their country, would be a difficult task, and an ungrateful office.

A well appointed 'corps of reserve' would serve both as bane and antidote of this. It would supply the service with officers in war; and at the return of peace, their former and more lucrative employments in the ship-master's line would be open to them—and at most, it would require no great effort on the part of the government, to induce them again to seek the command of merchant vessels.

But Harry Bluff has treated at large upon this

subject; the scheme is his; and to him, I therefore beg leave to refer for a more detailed account of the advantages of such an arrangement.

Connected with the Academy at Memphis, should be a School of Engineers for Naval Apprentices. Here the engineers of the public steam-vessels should be educated. After the Navy had been supplied with its due complement of these, the remaining graduates from this school, could be encouraged to seek—and doubtless they would readily find—employment as engineers in the river-boats, and ocean-steamers. And upon these also, the Navy could rely, for skilful engineers for the extra steamers that would be called in the service in time of war,—when of course, many of the mercantile vessels in which they had before served, would be transferred to the government, or laid up from the want of employment.

In connection with this subject, I shall invite your attention to another matter of vast importance to this country. France and England are gaining great Naval and commercial strength, by the encouragement which they give to ocean-steamers. Under the wise and liberal policy of these two nations, their citizens are preparing to make a net-work on every ocean, and even to girdle the earth about, with their lines of steam-packets. Are you aware of the fact, that the Great Western was not allowed to take out her papers, until her owners had given the government bond and security, to transfer her over to the Crown, in case of war? They all do the same; for which certain considerations are allowed in hand; and others guarantied, in case the Crown requires the services of these vessels.

Constructed with an eye to war, and maintained at private cost, (for the Crown is fully reimbursed for its portion of the expense,) England has now, or soon will have, a force of not less than fifty steam-frigates, with which her citizens are carrying on a profitable commerce with her friends in peace, and with which she is ready to do battle with her enemies in war.

Give but a decent encouragement to the well-known industry and enterprise of American citizens, and fleets of ocean-steamers will speedily go forth under the 'stars and stripes' to out-do the 'lion and the cross,' with commerce in peace, and to match them, with their guns in war.

It were wise, therefore, for the government to agree to pay one-fifth, or more, of the prime cost of ocean-steamers over —— tons, and that could carry fuel and provisions enough to keep the sea over —— days. In other words, that should pass a board of inspectors, appointed for the purpose. In consideration of which, the owners should be bound to have these steamers commanded and navigated by government officers—to allow the government the privilege (to be availed of or not) of maintaining on board —— number of guns and supernumeraries in time of peace,—and when required for war, the vessels to be turned over to the United States at a par valuation.

In the School of Engineers at Memphis, the engineers of these boats might also be educated.

At this stage of the business, and in times of peace, it is clearly against our policy and interest to maintain abroad our squadrons of war-steamers. At present, we have no other employment for them, than such as may be required of them in the West-Indies, or along our own coast, as vessels of the 'Home squadron,' and,—as a part of it—of the revenue service.

If then we are to build steamers, and lay them up to rot, as we have our line-of-battle ships, it would be a wise measure in political economy to let responsible merchants have the free use of all such steamers, on condition that they should be employed in the commerce of the country, be kept in repair, and turned over to the government when required. How much better then, to assist the merchant to build these vessels, with the privilege of buying them at any time thereafter!

As a matter of economy, there are strong reasons for having our reserved steamers—i. e. such as would be wanted only in case of war—built and owned by individuals, and employed in the manner proposed, until they be required for the purposes of the government. The United States Steamer Fulton cost $333,000. Such a vessel can be built in the private yards for $150,000. Should the payment of one-fifth afford sufficient encouragement to private builders—and I think it would—the enormous cost of this one public vessel would be enough to call into existence, and render available for the purposes of war, *eleven* such.

An appropriation of half a million annually, for the encouragement of ocean-steamers on the plan proposed, would, in the course of ten years,—if the wants of commerce would justify it—create a fleet of not less than one hundred and fifty steam-frigates-of-war. To render available five or six 74's, that are already rotten, or are rotting at their moorings, has cost more than this;—and as it has turned out, 'Cui bono?' for they have not been employed, either by individuals or the public—either for commerce, or protection.

The Navy Commissioners have expressed their opinion, that in the course of a few years forty steam-frigates will be required in the Navy—which will cost, say they, upwards of *thirteen* millions of dollars. Mark the difference—under the present system, it will cost at least six millions, every three years to *repair* these vessels—enough to keep perpetually in repair not less than 150 such, if used as packets in peace.

I have just seen the report of Mr. King from the Committee on Naval Affairs, and shall press this subject no further.

UNION JACK.

No. III.

Council Bluff, *July* 17, 1841.

TO MR. CLAY.

Sir,—

Having merely enumerated a few of the many advantages of a Navy-Yard and an Academy at Memphis, Tennessee—for in a case so plain, argument is useless—let us take a glance at some of the other establishments necessary to make the system complete. With a Navy-Yard in the West, a national foundry also becomes *essential* for the purpose of furnishing ordnance to the vessels built and equipped there.

The expense of transporting great guns for the Navy, from the Atlantic, across the Alleghanies, to the West; or of freighting them around to New-Orleans, and thence up to Memphis, would cost as much, probably more, than it would take to cast them in the West.

Where this foundry should be situated, I am not prepared to say, further, than that it should be on the waters of the Mississippi, *above* Memphis—at an intermediate point between the Gulf and the Lakes, and convenient to supplies of coal and iron.

In urging the importance of *good* guns, such as a national foundry would give for our vessels-of-war, it is only necessary to remind you of the fact, that in the last war, we *had more men killed on the Lakes by the bursting of our own guns, than by the shot of the enemy.* It is a terrible thing in action, and a great damper upon the bravery of the most gallant tar, when he is afraid of his own piece.

Intimately connected with these establishments, and with the prosperity of the South and West, is a system of national defences on the Lakes in the North, and on the Gulf in the South. Of the latter I shall speak in my next.

In a war with England; or, in case of separation, in a war with Canada, we should first have to build the ships, before we could have any Naval force on the Lakes. The enemy might get the start of us, and, before we could send out a vessel, bombard our towns, burn our villages, or destroy our Lake trade entirely, which is many times more valuable than theirs. Therefore we have the more at stake.

At the return of peace, the public armed vessels there, would be dismantled, and laid up to rot—for the public could make no use of them.

To prevent such evils—as an act of justice to the West, and for the security and prosperity of the Union, the Lakes should be tapped with a steamboat canal from the waters of the Mississippi.

You were the Hercules of the National Road; the same powerful arguments which you used for proving the importance, the national character, and the constitutionality of that undertaking, might be repeated with like, nay, with more force of eloquence and reason for a National Canal.

In war, the armed steamers at the Memphis Yard, could run through that canal, and gain the important advantage of striking the first blow upon the Lakes. They could sweep those inland waters of the enemy's commerce; and, by gaining with a timely blow, easily maintain, the supremacy of the Lakes. At the return of peace, these vessels, instead of being dismantled there to rot, could be withdrawn by way of the National Canal, and returned to their former posts in the Gulf of Mexico, or in protecting the revenue on the Atlantic coast.

The cost of the armed vessels which a three years' war with England would leave upon the Lakes, would well nigh suffice to construct this canal. But the National Canal, like the National Road, whether it were ever required for the purposes of war or not, would be worth its full value, and far more than cost, to the Union. In this scheme all the West, from Louisiana up, are deeply interested, for the incidental advantages to those States would be very great—all of which *you* will comprehend at a glance.

Union Jack.

—

No. IV.

Council Bluff, *July* 20, 1841.

TO MR. CLAY.

Sir,—

Let us now look into the condition of our Naval establishments and means of defence in the South.

Take the map of North America, and cast your eye on it from the Capes of Virginia down the Atlantic coast—passing around the Florida reefs, into the Gulf of Mexico to the remote South-Western corner of the United States—a distance of about two thousand miles—and you will not find a single Naval Depot, at which even a sloop-of-war, whether disabled in a gale, or crippled in an action, could be repaired. Not a great while ago, a small Revenue cutter, had to be sent from the so-called Navy-Yard at Pensacola, to Charleston, South-Carolina, *to have her sides calked* and some slight repairs made.

Now, take the other side of the picture. Go back to Mason & Dixon's line, and run your finger towards the North on the map, that you may see what has been done for that region, in the way of Naval defences and improvements. In the waters of the Chesapeake, you find two well appointed Navy-Yards, and one Naval Station. In the waters of the Delaware is another large building Yard—less than two degrees farther on, you come to another extensive Dock-Yard at New-York—and a few hours thence, to two more—Boston and Portsmouth—both in the waters of Massachusetts.

Yet in all this partial protection, and unequal distribution of the national bounty, the South and the West have complained not. In these matters, Southern and Western statesmen have taken grounds far above mere local interests, state prejudices, or sectional jealousies; they have occupied

the high eminence of patriotism; with a free will and a liberal hand, they have been among the foremost to vote away the public money, wherever and whenever the honor, the safety, or the welfare of their country, required it. Without asking whether this or that State would be most benefited by a Naval appropriation, they have striven to make the Navy all that the dignity of their country, abroad, or its safety at home, requires it to be.

A despatch vessel-of-war sent from New-York to Pensacola, in the Gulf of Mexico, was thirty-four days in making the passage on one occasion, and fifty-six on the other. Upon an average it would take twenty or thirty days for a Naval force, from the nearest port of the North, to carry relief to the property of our citizens in the Gulf of Mexico. In consequence of such unequal distribution of the public Dock-Yards and Depots, most of the European powers, with their steam ships-of-war, are actually nearer to our commerce in the Gulf of Mexico, than we ourselves. In case of war, they have, much nearer than we, secure places of rendezvous for vessels of all kinds. To us, there would be no sufficient shelter, nearer than Norfolk.

Is protection less due to the South, than to the North? Does the vicinity of the West-India Islands with their black-a-moor regiments, afford to the South an especial guaranty, that in war, she shall enjoy immunities, and be exempt from dangers unknown to the North? Or is it because the safety of Georgia and the Carolinas, the integrity of their soil are less sacred—the products of Western Pennsylvania and Virginia; of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Missouri; of Iowa, Florida and Wiskonsin; of Kentucky and Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama, Louisiana and Arkansas—which pass through the Gulf of Mexico on their way to market—are all these interests, I say, left thus exposed, because they are of less importance in the Federal eye, than their sister-interests in the North? Or shall the defenceless condition of the South and the West, be ascribed to the selfishness of the North and the East, which hitherto have been ascendant in the National Councils? No sir. Ascribe that rather to the apathy of the former two on the subject, and to their numerical weakness in the legislative halls of the nation. It rests with you to rouse them up. Under the new apportionment of representation, their repesentatives will outnumber those of the Northern and Middle States on the floors of Congress. *Verbum sat.*

Bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, are the Islands of Cuba, Jamaica, and St. Domingo, besides groups of smaller ones, and the States of Texas, Mexico, and Central America; any, or all of which, are liable to be occupied by powers at war with the United States.

The Gulf is the Mediterranean of these countries; which, owing to the winds at the South, Cuba and the Bahamas at the East, is as much closed against egress, except through the straits of Florida, as is the Mediterranean proper, except through the straits of Gibraltar.

The only pass from this Gulf belongs to us; and by us should be secured at whatever cost. Key-West is the Gibraltar of these straits, with a harbor susceptible of being strengthened and rendered impregnable as that.

The South and the West are never secure, nor their defences complete, until this be made a strong hold, where the public vessels may rendezvous in war, and merchantmen retreat for safety.

France has made Toulon, in the Mediterranean, her great Naval establishment. Spain too had her Carthagena. What Toulon is to France, and Carthagena was to Spain, Pensacola is to us. Though Spain had the Dock-Yards of Fayal and Cadiz, and France those of Cherberg and Brest, outside of their Mediterranean, the exigences of war soon taught each of them, the importance of good Naval Stations at Carthagena and Toulon.

From the experience of Spain, and the example of France, let the South and West learn a lesson; and resolve to press the subject, shoulder to shoulder; nor to give over, until the Naval establishment at Pensacola be made the Toulon of their Mediterranean.

Pensacola has many advantages. Its natural position is important. It is in the midst of our live-oak forests, as it were; and it is convenient to excellent timber and Naval stores, and has all the resources required to make it an important Naval station. And it should be abundantly furnished with all the materials, means and facilities, which are to be found at the North, for building, equipping, and repairing our men-of-war. Suitable Depots, and places of rendezvous, ought, also, to be supplied along the coast of Georgia, North and South-Carolina.

This subject has been often treated of before, and with an ability to which I dare not aspire. I have no higher aim than merely to call your attention, or that of some one of your compatriots, to it.

UNION JACK.

LOVE.

What a sad thing is love!
To sit and think the livelong day,
Of one, than your own heart's blood dearer;
To pass in sighs your nights away,
Yet find your happiness no nearer.
To keep your faith as pure as snow,
To know your love has never falter'd,
Then bide, unwarn'd, the rending blow
Of smiles estrang'd, and fond tones alter'd.

What a sweet thing is love!
To hold the dear one's yielded hand—
Pass with her, hours of free communion,
Whilst schemes of happiness are plann'd—
The sweet reward of nearer union.